10. Conclusion By now it will be apparent to the reader that this survey is far from complete, based as it is on evidence which is itself incomplete. The extent of the available evidence is described in more detail in the "Note on Sources for the History of the Coalfield" and Appendices which follow. Furthermore, the quantitative data which has been discovered has not been subjected to the statistical analysis which it merits but which is beyond the capabilities of the writer. Despite these limitations, however, it is possible to draw several general, if obvious, conclusions about the industry. From an examination of the statistical evidence, it is clear that, although there is no reason to regard Bristol and Somerset as geologically separate, there was a very real difference between the coal industries of the two districts. The reason for this is unclear, and although it is tempting to attribute it to the more extensive working of the mines in the Bristol district at an early date, any such suggestion must remain speculation. Morgans noted that over 50% of the coal measures were exposed in the northern part of the coalfield, whilst in the south the corresponding figure is approximately 10%, a fact which he felt might partially explain the fact that “coal getting has been more resolute” in the north. (W Morgans (1884: John Wright & Co: Bristol) A Survey of the Bristol Coal-field, p. 6) Throughout the period under examination, the industry had to cope with two major problems: difficult geological conditions and technological backwardness. Nothing, of course could be done to change the former, but dealing with them was made all the more difficult by the latter, which can only be blamed on the owners. The reason for their failure to adopt new technology is, however, elusive. The fact that the industry was fully mechanised under the NCB proves that the geological problems were not insurmountable, even, if Greasley is to be believed, with pre-war technology. The reasons given by those such as Sir Frank Beauchamp are convincing at first sight, but look less so on closer examination. It is most likely that the true reasons are to be found in some yet to be identified economic factors, which may be as basic as the parsimony of the owners. The development of the coal industry in the Bristol region from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards reflects the emergence of big business which was taking place on a national and international scale, although, of course, the businesses involved were insignificant when compared to their national and international counterparts. The Beauchamp family were successful in the development of their businesses, whilst Egbert Spear and the Bennett family failed. In the absence of detailed business records it is impossible to account for this, but the fact that eight collieries owned by the Beauchamps survived into the NCB era, compared with two of Spear’s and none of the Bennett family’s seems significant, even allowing for the large number of collieries owned by the Beauchamps at some stage in their lives, although it is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from this. In the final analysis, it may be that the attitudes and personalities of the individuals involved in the industry were as important as any technical or economic factors. Harvey and Press have claimed that, before 1914, the leaders of the business community in Bristol …formed an economic elite with powerful social and political connections. They jointly promoted many companies, held many directorships, and controlled a large number of major enterprises. (Charles Harvey & Jon Press (1988) “Industrial Change and the Economic Life of Bristol since 1800,” in Harvey & Press (1988) pp. 1-32, 26) There is clearly considerable scope for further investigation of such a group which must have extended beyond Bristol to include many individuals in business in the surrounding towns. The previous chapters have described some small sections of the network of business, political and social relationships of the mine owners who were, or, it may be assumed, aspired to be, part of this elite and it seems clear that a closer examination of those relationships is vital to achieving a full understanding of the industry. If the aspirations of the owners played a key role in the rise of the industry, the aspirations of the workers may have played a decisive role in its decline. Bonsall, quoting Williamson, has suggested that this was the result of changing attitudes to the industry amongst its workforce, which in turn resulted from the rejection of the industry by the mining community, a process which she feels was under way in Somerset during the 1920s and 1930s. (Penny Bonsall (1989) “The Somerset Coalfield, 1947-1973: Attitudes and Responses to Pit Closures in the Post-Nationalisation Era,” Southern History, 11, pp. 114-130, 127) Perhaps, in the light of this, the last word can, for the moment, be left to a South Liberty miner, who, looking back some sixty years after the closure of the pit, remarked: “It’s the worst day’s work ever I done when I went down there and the best day’s work they done was when they closed it down.” (Miners’ Memories (Bedminster and Ashton) (nd: CLASS: Bristol) p. 9) NEXT